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Daniel Georgianna & Corinn Williams
In The New Division of Labor, Levy and Murnane describe a world of work
re-shaped by computers where workers whose jobs can be reduced to steps
based on rules are replaced, and where jobs that require judgment or nego-
tiation are enhanced. The authors test the hypothesis of Levy and
Murnane’s work with a close look at Fall River and New Bedford. These
cities, with high unemployment and low rates of educational attainment,
show patterns of job replacement by computers as compared with Massa-
chusetts as a whole — a wealthy state with high rates of education, which
shows a pattern of jobs enhanced by computers. Finally, the authors focus in
on the recent bank mergers in southeastern Massachusetts for indications of
what our future holds.
Daniel Georgianna, Chancellor Professor of Economics at University of Massachusetts
Dartmouth, specializes in resource and regional economics.1 Corinn Williams is
Executive Director of the Community Economic Development Center of  Southeastern
Massachusetts.
he Luddites, loosely organized bands of cottage and factory workers,
roamed the English Midlands in the early 1800s, destroying machines
that vastly increased output per worker and thereby sharply reduced em-
ployment and wages.1 In 1812, the English army broke the rebellion and
many Luddites were jailed and some hanged. As early as ten years before,
English laws banned machines that replaced workers.
Oddly enough, David Ricardo, the leading economist of the time who
supported free markets as the best economic policy, agreed with the
Luddites that machinery, under certain conditions would cause unemploy-
ment.2 He argued, however, that the gains in production would probably
eventually increase employment. While the Luddites opposed the negative
effects of machinery on their lives and on the quality of their products
rather than the machines themselves, Luddites became emblematic of
romantics who oppose all machinery and who seek to stop progress.
As in England, the Industrial Revolution in the United States saw the
continuing growth of new technology that increased output but reduced the
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employment and wages of workers skilled in previous technologies. Early
unions and social reformers tried to mitigate the degrading effects of indus-
trialization but were largely unsuccessful. During the last two decades of
the nineteenth century, for example, after a series of strikes led by the
powerful mule-spinners union who fought a losing battle over wage cuts,
Fall River and New Bedford mill owners replaced mule-spinner machines
with ring-spinning machines, which required less skill and strength to oper-
ate.3
After World War II, the new industrial unions such as the United Auto
Workers (UAW) negotiated work rules to protect their members from the
wage-cutting tendencies of automation. As a general strategy, the UAW was
willing to accept fewer jobs in exchange for higher wages in the face of
advancing automation and foreign competition. The UAW lost almost two-
thirds of its 1.5 million members between the late 1970s and 2003.4
Computers and related telecommunication technology pose the newest
and most pervasive threat to jobs and to the wages of low-income workers.
Those who analyze the effects of computers fall into two general camps:
those who argue that computer technology will eliminate most high-paying
blue collar and clerical jobs, leaving low-wage or part-time jobs in service
industries, and on the other side, those who argue that computer technology
will create more than enough high-paying jobs for those with computer
skills. Jeremy Rifkin, for example, predicts that while computers create
some good jobs for lucky college graduates, the majority of workers re-
placed by computers will spill over into low-wage, non-benefited jobs,
driving down those wages even lower.5 On the other hand, Peter Drucker
believes computer technology eliminates drudgery in factories and offices
and creates a large demand for the high-paying jobs held by those skilled in
the new technology.6 Drucker’s answer for displaced workers and their
children is better schooling to enable them to learn the new skills.
A new approach to understanding the effects of computer technology on
jobs focuses on how computers interact with human intelligence. According
to Levy and Murnane in The New Division of Labor, computers enhance
jobs that require judgment and problem solving such as those in the profes-
sions of medicine, law, and education, by increasing productivity and wages
in those jobs.7 Employment in technology will increase to service these
computer-enhanced professions, supporting Drucker’s vision of technology
driving the economy toward more employment with higher wages.
At the same time, computer technology replaces jobs that can be reduced
to a set of rules, such as the work done by bank tellers. Rules-based jobs are
found in both low-wage and high-wage employment. Computer technologies
can replace check-out clerks, most blue-color factory workers, and many
low-wage office jobs, such as those of file clerks, but they also replace or
de-skill high-end jobs that can be reduced to rules, albeit complex rules such
as those of stock-marker traders and bank-loan officers.
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Current computer technology, the authors argue, cannot replace jobs that
require real-time judgment, and these may be low-wage jobs. Computers,
for example, cannot clean a room or care for an infant, both of which
require more mobility and judgment about immediate circumstances than
computers can now perform. Computers can attach a door to an auto
chassis on an assembly line, but they cannot make a left-hand turn into on-
coming traffic. Nor can computers effectively negotiate conflicts between
people. Negotiation requires recognition of fine distinctions in arguments
and the ability to adjust to subtle signals between the negotiators. Comput-
ers do not even help very much except with filing information. Although
proven to be inefficient, meetings are still generally preferred over other
forms of complex communication and negotiation. In many occupations,
judgment is not easily separated from rules-based decisions. Many medical
decisions, for example, seem more rules-based than judgment-based, but the
interpersonal nature of the job leads patients to demand human interaction.
People want doctors to explain their illnesses and sympathize with them,
they want to talk with their lawyers about their legal problems, and they
want to be able to exchange ideas with their teachers while being instructed
by them. In the authors’ terms, computers have not replaced these jobs
because satisfying patients, clients, and students requires human interaction
and negotiation — skills and abilities that computers do not have.
The difficulty in replacing workers with computers does not lead to
higher wages for these jobs, however, because there is a large supply of
people who can do them. In other words, the authors agree with Rifkin that
people replaced by computers may add to the supply of labor in the non-
computerized service sector, driving wages down in those fields. But they
also agree with Drucker and Ricardo: computer-enhanced jobs will more
than make up for the jobs lost to automation.
Computer and other electronic technology also contribute to outsourcing,
the other major cause of job loss in the United States. Low-cost electronic
technology cannot replace people in telephone marketing and other tele-
phone services, for example, because these jobs (like those of doctors,
lawyers, and teachers) require negotiation and human interaction. But
information technology (IT) can shift these jobs to English speakers in low-
wage countries.
Massachusetts has benefited more than almost every other state from
computer technology. While constant innovation has not always favored the
Massachusetts high-tech industry (the collapse of Digital and Wang in the
1980s are cases in point), there can be little doubt that the development and
uses of computer technology have contributed to Massachusetts’ standing
as third among states in per capita income. Fall River and New Bedford
represent the other side of the story where we find job replacement by
computers (and outsourcing), little gain in computer-enhanced jobs, and
low-wage jobs in service sectors that cannot be replaced by computers.
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Fall River and New Bedford:
Computer Technology & Employment
Fall River and New Bedford, are located fifteen miles apart in southeastern
Massachusetts. They evolved from different economic stimulus in the
nineteenth century, but they developed into similar cities in the twentieth.
Fall River grew quickly into a major textile center in the early 1800s by
taking advantage of a “falling river” to generate power to produce small
quantities of yarn and cloth and later using the abundant water in the flats
below the mill to dye and finish the larger quantities of cloth produced by
steam power.
New Bedford’s natural harbor and access to rail transport helped it
become the world’s leading whaling port in the early century, producing
whale oil for light and lubricants. When petroleum products eliminated the
market for whale oil in the late 1800s, New Bedford turned to finely woven
textiles aided by the city’s high relative humidity, which helped hold the
finely spun and woven fibers together.
Of the two cities, Fall River, with its coarsely woven product, was first to
succumb to competition from low wages in the South, in the late nineteenth
century. New Bedford’s textile industry followed south soon after World
War I, when the automatic humidifier and more efficient machinery elimi-
nated its advantage over the South in making finely woven cloth.
Both cities sought to replace their textile industries with clothing and
other cloth-based product employers. With cheap, skilled labor and subsi-
dized space in the abandoned textile mills, they successfully attracted
clothing manufacturing jobs from New York City shops for some time. But
these businesses eventually also drifted south and overseas, with NAFTA
delivering the final blow during the 1990s. At the beginning of the twenty-
first century, the two cities look alike in population, employment, and social
characteristics. Fall River and New Bedford have about 90,000 inhabitants
each, steadily declining from their peaks of about 130,000 and 140,000,
respectively in the 1920s.8
Statistics for unemployment, poverty rates, median family income, and
high school and college graduation rates suggest that these two cities fall on
the wrong side of the division of labor. Blue-collar cities that suffered from
sharp declines in manufacturing, they usually rank first and second in the
state in unemployment, with lower median income and higher poverty rates
than the state. As Levy and Murnane would predict, education rates are
also quite low in New Bedford and Fall River.
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Table 1.   Economic and Social Characteristics, 1969 and 1999
Fall River, New Bedford, Massachusetts, and the nation
Unem- Median H.S. College
ployed Poverty Family Grad. Grad.
Rate Rate Income Rate Rate
1969
FR 5.1% 10.8% $  8,289 25.6%   4.3%
NB 5.1% 11.9% $  8,230 27.8%   3.7%
MA 3.7%    6.2% $10,835 58.5% 12.6%
U.S. 4.4% 10.7% $  9,590 52.3% 10.7%
1999
FR 7.0% 14.0% $ 37,671 56.6% 10.7%
NB 8.7% 17.3% $35,708 57.6% 10.7%
MA 4.6%   6.7% $ 61,664 84.8% 33.2%
U.S. 5.8%   9.2% $ 50,046 80.4% 24.4%
Source: 1970 and 2000 Census of the Population
In 2002, 22 percent of all employment in the region was in education and
health services, having passed manufacturing at 19 percent.9 The major
employers in both cities are hospitals. The University of Massachusetts
Dartmouth, located almost exactly between Fall River and New Bedford, is
the other major employer in the region.
Over the past thirty years, both unemployment and poverty rates have
increased in relation to rates for the state and the nation. In 1969 and 1999,
the years these data were collected, the business cycle was close to its peak
with unemployment rates for the state and the nation around 4 percent in
1969 and 5 percent to 6 percent in 1999. Unemployment rates in Fall River
and New Bedford, however, increased from an average of 5 percent for the
two cities in 1969 to an average of 8 percent in 1999, while poverty rates
increased from an average of 11 percent to an average of 16 percent,
roughly double the rates for Massachusetts and the nation. Median family
income in the two cities fell relative to the state, from 76 percent in 1969 to
59 percent in 1999 of the state’s median family income.
Juxtaposing the labor markets in Fall River and New Bedford with labor
markets in Massachusetts provides a more direct test for theories in The
New Division of Labor. We examine if the two cities show characteristics of
labor markets dominated by computer-replaced jobs within a state labor
market characterized by computer-enhanced jobs.
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While basically a theoretical discussion of the effect of computer technol-
ogy on labor markets, Levy and Murnane use the 1970 and 2000 Census of
the Population to test their hypothesis.10 They argue that increases from
1969 to 1999 in Managers & Administrators and Professional Occupations
& Technicians are consistent with increases in computer-enhanced jobs. The
increases in Service Workers and Sales Related Occupations are consistent
with an increase due to the economic expansion over the period in jobs that
computers cannot do. The declines in Administrative Support and Blue
Collar Workers are consistent with computer replacement in those jobs.
The same variables over the same time period for Massachusetts show a
pattern similar to that of the United States (Table 2). The differences be-
tween the U.S. and Massachusetts patterns support Levy and Murnane’s
hypothesis. Computer enhanced jobs (management and professions) in-
creased in Massachusetts, a state economy focused on high tech jobs with a
well-educated work force, from 26 percent in 1969 to 41 percent in 1999,
more than the increase in the United States as a whole (from 21 percent to
33 percent). The loss of Administrative Support and Blue Collar employ-
ment, jobs that computers can replace was greater in Massachusetts (from
54 percent to 34 percent) than in the nation as a whole (from 56 percent to
30 percent)
Table 2.   Changes in Percentage of Employment
    between 1969 and 1999
Fall River & New Bedford, Massachusetts and the nation
FR & NB MA U. S.
1969 1999 1969 1999 1969 1999
Computer Enhanced 13% 22% 26% 41% 21% 33%
Service & Sales 18% 29% 20% 25% 20% 26%
Computer Replaced69% 49% 54% 34% 56% 39%
Source: 1970 and 2000 Census of the Population
The patterns of change in the labor markets in Fall River and New
Bedford are quite different from those in Massachusetts and the nation as a
whole. Averaging the data for the two cities, which are very similar, the
increases in computer enhanced jobs (management and professions) be-
tween 1969 and 1999 was substantially less, from 13 percent to 22 percent,
than the increase for the state as mentioned above. The increase in Service
Workers and Sales Related Occupations was larger for the two cities (18
percent to 29 percent), substantially higher than the increase for the state
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(20 percent to 25 percent). These are typically low-wage jobs, probably
filled in part by displaced workers from manufacturing. The percentage loss
of jobs that can be replaced by computers is similar for Massachusetts and
these two cities, but the percentage of jobs in these categories remains quite
high in Fall River and New Bedford, forecasting continuing economic
problems for these cities. These results are consistent with Levy and
Murnane’s hypothesis.
Computer-enhanced jobs probably require more knowledge of mathemat-
ics. Once again, Fall River and New Bedford fall behind the state on this
score. The Massachusetts Comprehensive Assessment System (MCAS) is a
series of tests in Math and English Language Arts required for a public high
school diploma that ranks among the most difficult in the United States.
Students are ranked by the tests as Advanced, Proficient, Needs Improve-
ment, or Failing. In 2001, 21 percent of students in the SouthCoast region,
which includes both cities, ranked as either Advanced or Proficient in Math
compared to 45 percent for the state.11 The English Language Arts scores
were also lower, 40 percent for the SouthCoast region and 50 percent for
the state ranked as either Advanced or Proficient.
Banking in Southeastern Massachusetts
It’s 10 A.M. on Saturday. A long line of customers patiently waits for a turn
with one of six bank tellers in a neighborhood branch bank. A pleasant
young woman standing by the queue smiles and greets customers, directing
a Portuguese-speaker to the appropriate teller. The longest line is outside at
the two-lane drive through. The ATM in the entryway does a brisk business
as well, and a few people are waiting to meet face to face with a customer
service person who stares into a computer screen to open accounts or track
loan payments.
Bank of America’s (BofA) red visuals dominate the décor replacing all
traces of Fleet Bank’s trademark green and navy blue. Another bank conver-
sion in New Bedford, and this time job losses did not make the headlines.
The lean, mean Fleet had already shed enough employment during the
mergers and acquisitions of the previous decade — a 31 percent decline in
bank employment from 1993 to 2003 in southeastern Massachusetts, or a
loss of 683 jobs.12 Fleet acquired NBB Bankcorp (formerly New Bedford
Institution for Savings) and Shawmut Bank in 1995. In 1996, Bank of Boston
acquired BayBanks as a hedge against Fleet, creating BankBoston and
eliminating more jobs. In 1999, Fleet acquired BankBoston and consolidated
its operations.
Another round of mergers between October 2003 and July of 2004
reduced employment in banking in the area by another 500 jobs. Late in
2003, Connecticut-based Webster Bank merged with FirstFed Bank head-
New England Journal of Public Policy
32
quartered in Swansea. The merger resulted in a loss of 150 jobs.13 A few
months later, BofA merged with Fleet Bank, a move that would result in a
14,000 job loss in Massachusetts. The BofA did not close many branches in
Southeastern Massachusetts because Fleet had already taken care of the
messy downsizing during the decade before.
In January 2004, Pennsylvania-based Sovereign Bank announced the
acquisition of Seacoast Financial Services, the parent company of New
Bedford-based Compass Bank. In contrast to the big regional bank (Fleet)
taken over by a giant national bank (BofA), the acquisition of Seacoast by
Sovereign Bank caused far more job losses in Southeastern Massachusetts.
Headquartered in downtown New Bedford, Compass employed over 350
mostly back office workers servicing forty-seven branches.14 The state-of-
the-art building was built in 1999, on the site of the main police station that
was razed to make room for the new jobs that would help revitalize down-
town New Bedford. Compass Bank was granted $1.2 million in Tax Incre-
ment Financing in return for retaining 188 employees and creating 192 new
jobs.15 Compass executives, for the most part local boys who made good,
were very visible on community boards and supportive of many mainstream
charity efforts.
 “You could have heard a pin drop” said twenty-five-year Compass
employee, Nancy Keith, when she heard the announcement with her co-
workers in the Union St. lunchroom about the Sovereign take-over.16 Nancy
had worked her way from teller to the back office records department
manager, which required her “to know a little bit of everything” about
90,000 files, from opening and closing legal documents, researching micro-
filmed bank statements, and keeping back files of bank records. In retro-
spect she said, “I should have put it together the year before, when plans to
convert microfilm to scanned imaging fell through.” Still, with her years on
the job and ability to handle complex projects, she said, “I first thought that
maybe I would be offered a position to stay on after the conversion.” But by
July 2004, Nancy and the thirteen others in her department had been laid
off. Although those in the branch offices remained, the rest of the back
office departments, 352 workers, who averaged fifteen years seniority in
customer information, collections, call centers, facilities, and money wiring,
were eliminated.
Nancy was eligible for job training. She upgraded her computer skills and
is now seeking a new position, but this time probably not in banking. “A lot
of my skills are transferable, but I tend to be overqualified.” Nancy’s work
is an example of the kinds of jobs remaining in banking: some requiring a
high skill level, for example, analysis of information retrieved by technology
and others require lower skill level such as those needed in a cashier. She
told us that she fell into a career in banking; she has a college degree in
education. “Many of the jobs are out of the area so I’m facing a three-hour
or more extension of the work day with commuting.” She stays in touch
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with her former co-workers who still get together once a month at a local
restaurant. She reports that for the most part, people have been finding
other positions, some at better pay than before. Nancy and her co-workers
were offered a modest severance package of two weeks pay for every year
worked, up to twenty-six weeks pay and a year extension on health ben-
efits.
In comparison, top brass at Compass took care of their own with gener-
ous golden parachutes, including a $15 million package ($4.6 million in
lump sum severance) for CEO Kevin Champagne, $7.3 million for James
McDonogh, CEO of Abington Savings (which was acquired by Seacoast
just prior to the Sovereign merger), and several other payouts to top execu-
tives in the $1 to $3 million range.17  With a hint of betrayal in her voice,
Nancy notes that “with just $1 million less in his package, Kevin could have
taken a lot better care of all of us; he’s not looking anyone straight in the
eye these days.”
Bank mergers in Southeastern Massachusetts are not just about the job
loss numbers. They are part of a massive restructuring of work caused
largely by new technology. The drivers of bank mergers are centralization
and consolidation to cut operating costs and expand market share of cus-
tomers. When two banks merge, it is often the back office facing the highest
rates of redundancy. Jobs, such as filing computer data from ATM transac-
tions, posting mortgage or credit card payments, and generating account
statements, are shifted away. For example, four loan-processing centers
now serve the entire United States.18 It is estimated that the Fleet/BofA
merger will reduce operating costs by 30 percent, which translates into
savings of $1.1 billion for the company.19
Loan processing, which in the past used armies of underwriters with
desks and file cabinets in local bank branches is one of the key jobs elimi-
nated by automation. The decision-making in mortgage lending is a prime
example of a task defined by rules-based logic. In the past, underwriters
would assemble information about the borrower including employment,
monthly income, credit history, ability to repay, and other debt obligations.
An underwriter, in part because a customer may have other ongoing deal-
ings with the bank, would weigh additional criteria to arrive at a decision.
For example, a credit history that had improved from five years ago or the
knowledge that a spouse who is at home with a baby is going back to work
full-time in six months could change a “no” to a “yes.” The loan officer
would use pattern recognition and intuitive knowledge to arrive at a deci-
sion. The loan officer would look for patterns in the history and draw on his
or her intuitive sense in arriving at a decision.
With automation based on software applying rules-based logic, the
human underwriter has almost been eliminated. One of the widely used
software packages, the Fannie Mae Desktop Underwriter ©, takes statisti-
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cal models of previously approved loans and their default rates to create a
scoring mechanism that arrives at an approval or rejection of the applica-
tion. Software-based underwriting has automated the steps that are taken
before reaching the underwriter — application input, scoring and credit
analysis, gathering client documents. These clerical back-office jobs are no
longer needed to prepare a loan application for review by the underwriter
software. Not even the reams of paper to prove credit worthiness pass
human hands; the faxed documents are scanned directly into the computer.
“What used to be fifty or sixty underwriters are no more than twelve in a
large bank.”20
On the positive side, the customer can get an approval as quickly as a
half an hour and can close within three days. On the downside, as many as
30 percent of credit scores are inaccurate, the rejection thresholds are set to
avoid a second review. In the past, an underwriter could factor in excep-
tions to the rules or work with a borrower to clear up credit issues, but not
anymore. This kind of automated system, designed for volume, can absorb
an additional one hundred applications anywhere in the system without any
need to hire more staff.21
 On the other end of the customer service spectrum, BofA’s Premier
Banking services target high net worth customers ($100,000 to $1million)
who have a direct line to their personal banker/financial advisor. A team of
sixteen personal bankers serves just three hundred and fifty select custom-
ers.22 These bankers can still take the time to build trust, listen and make
judgments as they make recommendations to their customers. This front-
line/high-end dichotomy is a byproduct of service job automation.
Automation and information technology has enabled banks to cut operat-
ing costs through consolidation and mergers but it also increases the ability
to cut costs by outsourcing key banking operations. Outsourcing is not new;
banks have historically used outside services from legal services to bonded
couriers that play a support role for several local banks. But the integration
of information technologies with outsourcing is new. As a rough estimate,
for every one bank employee, there are two outsourced jobs supporting
bank operations.23
The automation of service industries like banking, combined with the
introduction of new information-based technology not only replaces work-
ers but also fragments the work process and distributes it beyond any given
geographic territory. Banks provide both services of holding and investing
money and servicing debt and products, such as mortgages, IRA’s, credit
cards, and personal and commercial loans and lines of credit. With banking
deregulation, banks are also permitted to offer other products like insurance
and securities.24 Just as deregulation and digitalization have brought about
a convergence so that a phone company or a cable company can both sell
Internet services, automation and integration of information technology
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broadens the local scope of banks to a national and international business
platform. In this model, local communities and workers can be left behind to
suffer the consequences of job loss, but the products and services remain in
the community in the physical form of ATM kiosks or streamlined retail
branches and through Internet and phone access to services not locally
based.
There is also a wide spectrum of services that customers willingly do for
themselves on home computers, from bill paying to airline e-ticketing.
Automated speech recognition technology that calls up account data,
retrieves information, and connects to other phone numbers has already
replaced thousands of jobs.
While local and domestic outsourcing has been an ongoing process in
banking, information-based technology has given rise to a new wave of
foreign outsourcing often called off-shoring. Again the shifting of jobs off
shore is not new, ranging from the loss of rules-based jobs to the
outsourcing of routinized services like credit card processing or writing
software code. What is new about recent off-shoring is that these new
positions require higher skills and advanced degrees. Take this report on a
company in India as an example:
Inside Infosys Technologies Ltd’s impeccably landscaped 22-hectacre
campus in Bangalore, India, 250 engineers develop IT applications for
BofA. Elsewhere in the city, Infosys staffers process home loans for
Greenport Mortgage of Novate, Calif. Near Bangalore’s airport, at the
offices of Wipro Ltd., five radiologists interpret 30 CAT scans a day for
Massachusetts General Hospital.25
The Boston Globe reported in May, 2004, that BofA may hire up to 1,500
software programmers through the Continuum Solutions subsidiary in India.
According to ex-BofA managers and contractors, work that costs $100 in
the United States gets done for $20 in India. Although not unique to bank-
ing, the anticipated trend toward greater off-shoring in Banking and Securi-
ties has put 2.3 million jobs in banking at risk, with an estimated potential
to shift $17.5 billion in operational and technical costs overseas by 2010,
according to a July 15, 2004, report by industry analyst Celent Communica-
tions.
 Recently in Southeastern Massachusetts as in the rest of the country,
credit unions, community savings banks, and specialty niche banks are
competing for the customers who are turned off by the big mergers. In New
Bedford and Fall River, the BCPbank headquartered in Portugal opened four
branches in the area last year to offer services to the more than 400,000
Portuguese speakers in the area.26 “The emerging polarization between
giant banks and small banks represents the future of the industry” accord-
ing to banking analyst Gerald Cassidy.27 While the number of banks has
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declined 40 percent in the United States since the 1970s, two hundred new
local banks were formed in 2000.28 While successful in attracting new
customers turned off by big banks, small banks that grow to medium size
like Rockland Trust with fifty-two branches and $2.4 billion in assets may
be prime targets for larger banks.29
Conclusion
The description of Fall River and New Bedford as economically depressed
cities within a rich state holds no surprises, but Levy and Murnane give
some insight into the mechanism by which these cities continue to fall
behind the rest of the state. They are losing rules-based jobs to computer
technology at about the same rate as Massachusetts, but these jobs are
going to non-computer service jobs, at best, in Fall River and New Bedford
and to computer-enhanced jobs in other parts of the state. This does not
bode well for Fall River and New Bedford. They will likely continue to lose
jobs to computer technology with little prospect of gaining computer-
enhanced jobs.
Fall River and New Bedford lag behind in income and education. During
successive waves of job loss during the past thirty years, living-wage union
manufacturing jobs fled due to shifting global forces outside of the region.
Some of these workers were retrained and were reabsorbed into lower-
wage health care, retail trade, and other service-based jobs, while high-tech
business was booming in other parts of Massachusetts. The current trans-
formation from service-based economies to the information age signals a
major technology-driven shift that has accelerated the pace of change and
the ability to shed labor.
In the past, a downsized worker might be able to retrain and find employ-
ment in another sector albeit at a lower standard of living (particularly if
the job was in an organized shop). But today, local labor has to compete
globally with labor markets that have an abundant supply of both cheap
and educated, higher-skilled workers. Many computer-enhanced jobs seem
likely to follow rules-based jobs out of the United States. Low-wage coun-
tries like the Philippines, China, and India can use computer and communi-
cation technology to supply thousands of engineers, radiologists, and finan-
cial analysts with offshore-ready college degrees.
Jobs not easily automated or outsourced such as those in retail trade,
wholesale distribution, front-line health care, human services, child care,
building trades, and primary sector jobs in agriculture and seafood harvest-
ing and processing will be key areas for the future of work in Southeastern
Massachusetts. Most of these jobs are low-wage and non-union with limited
benefits and security. Agriculture and seafood processing of this sort require
seasonal labor, often immigrant labor. These workers, mostly supplied by
temp companies, exist on the flip side of automation, doing manual tasks
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such as painstakingly trimming fish filets after they have passed through a
skinning machine.
At the end of The New Division of Labor, Levy and Murnane suggest
education based upon pattern recognition rather than facts or rules to
prepare students for computer-enhanced jobs. They also suggest teaching
interpersonal skills for negotiation-based jobs and praise MCAS exams in
Math and English Language Arts as steps in the right direction, because the
former focuses on pattern recognition (for example, geometry) and the
latter focuses on communication skills.
The authors do not comment on union representation. Rules-based jobs in
New Bedford and Fall River were represented by unions that raised wages
and benefits, while the non-computer service jobs that laid-off workers have
spilled into are not represented by unions. This probably contributes to the
decline in wages. Organizing these sectors, however, may prove both
difficult and unrewarding. Although Wal-Mart is a tempting target for
union organizing, the growing number of people who are applying for these
jobs and Wal-Mart’s practice of replacing jobs with computer technology, as
well as Wal-Mart’s strong opposition to unions, will make organizing very
difficult. Service jobs that can’t be replaced by computer technology or be
outsourced are far better targets for job-hunters while computer-enhanced
jobs may be a better target for union organizers.
The speed of technological change that drove the Luddites to smash machin-
ery continued after their defeat. Within twenty years, virtually all poor
children over the age of five in the cities of the Midlands were working from
dawn to dusk in hot and dusty factories producing wealth for others. While
there is little evidence that computer technology, which moves as fast and as
relentlessly as the Industrial Revolution, will produce the same squalor,
there is strong evidence that this revolution will leave a large class of low-
wage jobs without benefits in its wake.
Notes
The authors thank Kate Bloomingdale for collecting data from the Census of the Population
and constructing both tables.
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